People's Republic of China — critical-materials export-control regime, incumbent supply position, and US–China tariff exchange of 2025

This entry maps the People's Republic of China as it touches the portfolio. The node is deliberately bounded: it is not "China the country" as a diffuse geopolitical topic. It is three connected mechanisms with documented footprints in the thesis-state atoms — the PRC critical-materials export-control regime (the restrictions China placed on antimony, dysprosium, terbium, and related materials beginning in 2024), China's incumbent global supply position in the same materials, and the US–China tariff exchange of 2025 (the reciprocal tariffs imposed since March 2025 that closed export channels in both directions). A rulebook, a market share, and a pair of customs schedules — not a place.

This node has a different shape from the five prior masses-layer entries. The Department of War entry documented a counterparty that pays money and signs contracts; the NRC entry documented a regulator that issues licenses; OBBBA documented a static statutory instrument. China is none of those, and it is unlike them in one specific way: it is two-faced. The same entity is simultaneously the demand-creating force behind several holdings and a lost revenue line for others. China restricting its own antimony and heavy-rare-earth exports is the event that gives the domestic-producer holdings their pricing; China's reciprocal tariffs closing its market is the event that removed a revenue stream from other holdings. No prior node carries this duality. The Department of War only ever pays money in one direction. China subtracts revenue from one set of portfolio tickers and adds it to another, and the two effects trace to the same 2025 sequence of measures and counter-measures.

Because China is not a counterparty that acts on the portfolio's behalf, this entry is organized by connection type — (A) China as export-control regime and supply-dominant antagonist, (B) China as closed or lost export market — followed by a backdrop subsection for tickers where China is named only as generic context. The forward risk attached to this node is not a counterparty walking away; it is the durability or reversal of the 2025 export-control and tariff measures. The MP 10-K records that a US–China trade deal reached in November 2025 suspended the expanded export controls and the retaliatory tariffs imposed since March 2025, and the filing does not characterize that suspension as permanent (atom MP-0001801368-26-000008, reported_results[29]). The UUUU Q1 2026 10-Q carries tariff and trade-war risk for its REE and HMS product sales as a standing risk factor (atom UUUU-0001385849-26-000021, risk_factor_deltas).

Connection type A — China as export-control regime / supply-dominant antagonist (demand-creating)

This is the demand-creating face of the node. For three holdings, China's restriction of its own exports — against a backdrop of Chinese dominance of mine output or processing — is the event that converts a domestic producer's output into a higher-value or strategically distinct product. The connection is not a contract; it is a market structure the filings describe as the reason the holding's economics changed.

UAMY — antimony

United States Antimony Corporation is the clearest demand-creating connection in the node, and the citation discipline here matters: the structural China facts sit in the atom's context field (journalistic synthesis), while the price and margin consequences sit in reported_results (hard claims). The UAMY FY2025 10-K's context field states that antimony is produced predominantly in China, which has controlled roughly 70–80% of global mine output historically, and that beginning in mid-2024 China enacted export restrictions on several critical minerals including antimony, tightening global supply and driving the Rotterdam spot price from roughly $10/lb in 2024 to peaks above $30/lb during 2025 before moderating in the second half (atom UAMY-0001104659-26-032049, context). That China market-share and export-restriction framing is the atom's synthesis layer, not a hard reported number — a reader should weigh it as the summarizer's contextualization rather than a figure lifted from a filing table.

The price consequence is a hard claim. The same 10-K reports a Rotterdam average antimony market price of approximately $23.88/lb in 2025 versus $10.44/lb in 2024, and UAMY's own average realized price per pound rising to $25.12 in FY2025 from $7.61 in FY2024 — a 230% increase (atom UAMY-0001104659-26-032049, reported_results). UAMY's FY2025 total revenue of $39.3M was up 163% year over year (atom UAMY-0001104659-26-032049, reported_results). The Q1 2026 10-Q records the second-order effect of the same price cycle: the average antimony cost per pound rose 69% year over year as higher-cost ore — purchased during the 2025 run-up — moved through cost of sales, outpacing the 22% rise in realized price and compressing the gross spread (atom UAMY-0001104659-26-061193, reported_results). The export-restriction event raised the price; the lagging ore-cost structure means the margin benefit is not symmetric with the price move.

UAMY is also a cross-node ticker. It appears in department-of-war.md for its $27.0M DPA Title III grant and its $248M DLA IDIQ ceiling (atom UAMY-0001104659-26-061217_ex99-1; atom UAMY-0001104659-26-061193, reported_results). The China node and the DoW node both touch UAMY, and the relationship between them is causal in the same direction: China's antimony export restrictions are the supply-security event, and the US Department of War grant and stockpile contract are the policy response. At UAMY the two nodes are aligned — China created the scarcity, the DoW is paying to build domestic capacity against it.

REA — heavy rare earths (dysprosium, terbium)

Rare Earths Americas is a pre-revenue exploration-stage company whose geological thesis is indexed to China's heavy-rare-earth position. The connection here is a hard reported claim: the IPO prospectus states that China restricted the export of dysprosium and terbium since April 2025 in response to US tariffs, and flags Myanmar — the source of heavy-rare-earth feedstock for China — as an unreliable supply route due to civil war (atom REA-0001193125-26-209799, reported_results, citing the prospectus Market Assessment section). The atom's context field adds that REA's deposit style — ionic adsorption clay — is the deposit type that dominates Chinese heavy-rare-earth production and is rare outside China, and that the heavy-rare-earth emphasis is commercially relevant because the April 2025 Chinese export restriction created a documented supply gap for non-Chinese sources (atom REA-0001193125-26-209799, context).

The framing discipline matters for REA. The China export restriction is the demand-creating backdrop the prospectus cites, but the same atom is explicit that REA holds no mineral reserve at any project, has never produced minerals in commercial quantities, and expects to remain an exploration-stage company for the foreseeable future (atom REA-0001193125-26-209799, reported_results and forward_guidance). REA's connection to the China node is real and structural — its asset thesis is built on the heavy-rare-earth supply gap China created — but the connection is to a thesis, not to a revenue line. The prospectus itself notes that REA's Shiloh project timeline to production is measured in years through resource definition, permitting, feasibility, and capital formation, not months (atom REA-0001193125-26-209799, context). The node touches REA at the level of why the company exists, not at the level of a number on an income statement.

UUUU — heavy rare earths, ex-China benchmark positioning

Energy Fuels' connection to the China node runs through its rare-earth segment, and the citation basis is mixed — partly hard reported claims, partly context-layer synthesis. On the hard side: the Q1 2026 10-Q reports rare-earth oxide prices on a "Benchmark European, ex-China" basis, with NdPr oxide rising from $97.50/kg to $125.00/kg, dysprosium oxide from $988/kg to $1,300/kg, and terbium oxide from $3,575/kg to $4,500/kg during Q1 2026 (atom UUUU-0001385849-26-000021, reported_results). The choice of an ex-China benchmark is itself the connection — Energy Fuels prices its REE thesis against a non-Chinese reference because the company's positioning is as ex-China separation capacity. Also on the hard side: the same 10-Q reports that on March 25, 2026 the company produced its first kilogram of high-purity terbium oxide at the White Mesa Mill, which it described as "the first U.S. primary production of this critical 'heavy' rare earth material in decades," following pilot-scale production of approximately 30 kg of dysprosium oxide (atom UUUU-0001385849-26-000021, reported_results).

The "first ex-China heavy-rare-earth separation capacity in the western supply chain" framing sits in the atom context field rather than in a reported number — the FY2025 10-K's context states that ex-China heavy-rare-earth separation capacity has been absent from the western supply chain to date (atom UUUU-0001385849-26-000009, context). A reader should treat the absolute "first / only" positioning as the summarizer's synthesis and the price-table and pilot-production figures as the hard basis. As with REA, the China connection is to a thesis under construction: the UUUU FY2025 10-K states that REE profits are expected to be minimal until throughput is increased and optimized, expected in the 2028–2030 timeframe, and that the REE segment recorded zero revenue in both FY2025 and FY2024 (atom UUUU-0001385849-26-000009, reported_results and forward_guidance). The China export-control regime is the reason an ex-China heavy-REE separator has a strategic case; it is not yet the reason UUUU books revenue.

LYSDY -- the only commercial-scale separated REE producer outside China

Lynas Rare Earths is the most structurally entrenched ex-China REE node in the portfolio, and the citation surface on this connection is the deepest of the demand-creating face because Lynas's ex-China-processor status is the company's self-stated business identity rather than a forward thesis. The FY2025 Annual Report background field describes Lynas as the world's only commercial producer of both separated Light and Heavy Rare Earth oxides outside of China (atom LYSDY-manual_d37d7c2ff100d248, background). The same atom records that first commercial production of separated Dysprosium oxide was achieved at Lynas Malaysia in May 2025 and Terbium oxide in June 2025, and that Lynas is now the world's only commercial producer of separated Heavy Rare Earth products outside China, able to supply the two Heavy Rare Earth products required for rare earth permanent magnets used in electric motors (atom LYSDY-manual_d37d7c2ff100d248, reported_results). The Q3 FY2026 quarterly extends the heavy-REE line: first production of Samarium oxide occurred in March 2026, one month ahead of schedule, with an expected annual production capacity of approximately 400 tonnes; the same quarterly carries the self-description of Lynas as the only commercial-scale producer of separated light and heavy rare earth oxides operating entirely outside China (atom LYSDY-manual_714aac2447ae02d3, reported_results and context).

Unlike REA and UUUU -- the other two holdings on the demand-creating face -- Lynas's ex-China processor case is in the realized numbers, not the forward thesis. FY2025 group revenue was A$556.5m (+20.1% year-over-year), NdPr sales volume 6,555 tonnes (+18%), and the Lynas Malaysia plant uplifted to 10.5 kt p.a. nameplate NdPr capacity during the year (atom LYSDY-manual_d37d7c2ff100d248, reported_results). Q3 FY2026 quarterly revenue was A$265.0m, a 115% year-on-year increase and the highest quarterly figure since Q4 FY2022, with NdPr production of 1,996 tonnes representing roughly 62% of total REO output (atom LYSDY-manual_714aac2447ae02d3, reported_results). Lynas's revenue line is the operational referent against which UUUU's "ex-China benchmark" pricing series and REA's exploration-stage thesis are read.

The China pricing context that anchors the demand-creating mechanism is documented in Lynas's own atoms. The FY2025 Annual Report's risk-factor section quotes the average China domestic NdPr price (VAT excluded) rising from US$44.0/kg in June 2024 to US$55.0/kg in June 2025, with quarter-by-quarter readings (US$48 / $51 / $53 / $53/kg across the Sep-24 to Jun-25 quarters) (atom LYSDY-manual_d37d7c2ff100d248, reported_results, citing Page 20 risk factors). The FY2025 risk-factor delta added an explicit geopolitical-factors sub-bullet under rare earth price risk, citing global trade tariffs and restrictions and the global focus on supply chain resilience (atom LYSDY-manual_d37d7c2ff100d248, risk_factor_deltas). The 2024-2025 China-domestic price increase from $44 to $55/kg is the same supply-tightening backdrop that Lynas's growing Western customer base is sized against.

One boundary on the LYSDY-China connection: unlike MP and HL on the closed-market face, Lynas has no documented China customer channel to lose. The atoms record Lynas's customer base as Japanese, European, and North American (atom LYSDY-manual_d37d7c2ff100d248, background). Lynas is not subject to the same tariff-war-induced revenue subtraction that itemizes at MP and is named at HL. The China node touches Lynas only on the demand-creating face. Japan's contractual priority over Lynas's NdPr production -- documented in the JARE Availability Agreement that gives Japan Australia Rare Earths B.V. priority supply rights of up to 7,200 tonnes per year of NdPr until 2038 (atom LYSDY-manual_d37d7c2ff100d248, reported_results) -- is a constraint on supply redirection within the ex-China customer base, but is not a China-node fact and belongs to the Department of War entry where Lynas's emerging US Government offtake relationship is the counterpoint.

Connection type B — China as closed / lost export market (US–China tariff-war casualty)

This is the subtractive face of the node. For two holdings, the US–China tariff exchange of 2025 closed the China market to a product they had been selling there. This is the connection type that has no analogue in the Department of War entry — the DoW only ever adds a contract or a payment. China, through the reciprocal tariffs, removed a customer relationship.

MP — ceased all China sales as a condition of the DoW Transaction Agreements

MP Materials is the deepest connection in the node and the one cross-node hinge that the rest of this entry is built around. The FY2025 10-K states, in language worth quoting in full: "In July 2025, to align with the terms of the DoW Transaction Agreements and in further support of our domestic supply chain objectives, we ceased all sales of our products to China ... The cessation of shipments had, at least in the short term, a material negative impact on our business, operating results, financial performance and financial condition, cash flows and liquidity" (atom MP-0001801368-26-000008, reported_results[26], verbatim). The same reported_result records that, historically, the vast majority of rare earth concentrate was sold to a single principal distributor — Shenghe Resources — in China, and that REO Sales Volume fell 73% year over year as a direct result.

The financial trace of the cessation is documented across the MP atoms. Rare earth concentrate revenue fell from $144.4M in FY2024 to $42.0M in FY2025 and to $0 in Q1 2026 (atom MP-0001801368-26-000008, reported_results[4]; atom MP-0001801368-26-000029, reported_results[2]). REO Sales Volume fell from 32,703 MTs in FY2024 to 8,922 MTs in FY2025 (atom MP-0001801368-26-000008, reported_results[10]). The Q1 2026 10-Q states management expects rare earth concentrate revenues, "if any," to continue to be materially lower in future periods as MP no longer sells concentrate into the Chinese market (atom MP-0001801368-26-000029, forward_guidance).

What makes MP the hinge is the mechanism. MP did not lose the China market to a tariff it could not control — it gave up the China market as a contractual condition of accepting Department of War backing. The 10-K records this in two adjacent places. The cessation-of-China-sales reported_result attributes the action to alignment with the DoW Transaction Agreements (atom MP-0001801368-26-000008, reported_results[26]). The DoW negative-covenant reported_result states that the DoW Transaction Agreements restrict MP from "selling NdPr or magnets to any customer qualifying as a 'Restricted Buyer' under the Price Protection Agreement" (atom MP-0001801368-26-000008, reported_results[27], verbatim). The China node and the DoW node are therefore not two independent facts about MP — they are causally linked. Accepting the $400.0M preferred equity, the $150.0M Samarium Project Loan, the $110/kg NdPr price floor, and the 10X Facility offtake (all documented in department-of-war.md) required MP to sever its largest historical customer relationship. The DoW node added a government-backed revenue framework; the China node, on the same day, subtracted the Shenghe concentrate channel. The "Asymmetric geometry" section below develops why this cross-node linkage is the kind of finding invisible from per-ticker reading.

Note one boundary on the China node at MP: the November 2025 Maaden joint venture (atom MP-0001193125-25-287046_ex99-1) is a US–DoW–Saudi Arabia transaction and belongs to the Department of War entry, not here. China is named in the Maaden atom's context only as the holder of the historically commanding position in rare-earth separation that the Saudi refinery is meant to counter — backdrop, not a connection.

HL — China market "effectively closed" since March 2025

Hecla Mining's connection to the node is a hard reported claim and the cleaner example of the closed-market face — clean because, unlike MP, HL did not choose to exit. The FY2025 10-K states: "we historically have had significant sales into China. However, due to U.S. tariffs and China's reciprocal tariffs — currently 20% on our silver concentrate, the China market is effectively closed for us, and we have not shipped any products to China since March 2025" (atom HL-0001193125-26-055059, risk_factor_deltas, verbatim). The 10-K background field independently names the closure, listing Hecla's customers as custom smelters, metal traders, and refiners in Japan, South Korea, and Canada, with the China market closed to shipments since March 2025 due to US and Chinese tariffs (atom HL-0001193125-26-055059, reported_results, background).

The HL connection differs from MP's in two respects the atoms make explicit. First, the cause: HL lost the China market to a 20% Chinese reciprocal tariff on silver concentrate — a tariff-war casualty, not a covenant. Second, the magnitude disclosure: the HL atoms quantify a 20% tariff rate but do not quantify the lost China revenue as a separate line. The FY2025 10-K reports record total sales of $1.384B and the FY2025 10-K and Q1 2026 10-Q both attribute the company's results to silver and gold price strength rather than to the China closure (atom HL-0001193125-26-055059, reported_results; atom HL-0001193125-26-206810, context). The China market closure is a named and dated event in HL's filings, but the atoms do not isolate its dollar cost. A reader should note this: HL's China connection is structural and reported, but its financial weight is not separately quantified in the atoms, in contrast to MP, where the $144.4M-to-$0 concentrate-revenue collapse is itemized.

Backdrop / peripheral exposure (Tier 2 — China named only as generic context)

Three holdings name China in their filings, but in each case China appears as one element of a generic risk factor rather than as a structural connection. These tickers belong in related_tickers because they show the ambient reach of the 2025 tariff war across the book — they are not false positives — but they do not belong in either connection-type section above. They are documented here, clearly labeled, so that a reader scanning the related-tickers list understands the depth gradient.

RDW. Redwire's FY2025 10-K adds a risk factor noting that current US administration tariffs on imports from Canada, Mexico, the EU, Japan, and China may increase supply-chain costs, and that trading partners' retaliatory tariffs may raise the cost of products sold internationally (atom RDW-0001819810-26-000029, risk_factor_deltas). China is one of five named countries in a generic supply-chain-cost tariff risk factor. There is no China-specific revenue line, no China customer, and no China-specific export control in the RDW atoms. RDW is a Department-of-War and NASA node ticker (see department-of-war.md and nasa.md); on the China node it carries backdrop exposure only.

URG. Ur-Energy's April 2026 ATM prospectus carries forward a base-prospectus general risk factor that cites "U.S.-China tensions, wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, and recent tariff impositions" as creating uncertain impacts on nuclear-fuel markets and supply chains (atom URG-0001104659-26-044445, risk_factor_deltas). China is lumped with two active wars in a single geopolitical-risk sentence. URG is a domestic ISR uranium producer with term sales contracts to nuclear utilities; the atoms record no China customer, no China supply dependency, and no China-specific measure. Backdrop only.

LEU. Centrus Energy's connection is the most specific of the three Tier 2 names, and for that reason worth stating precisely so it is not mistaken for a structural connection. The FY2025 10-K adds a risk factor noting that the USTR's April 17, 2025 investigation into China's maritime sector could impose service fees on Chinese-built vessels, and that Centrus's LEU carrier uses Chinese-built vessels currently exempt but potentially exposed to future fees (atom LEU-0001628280-26-007117, risk_factor_deltas). This is a shipping-logistics exposure — a possible future cost on the vessels that carry Centrus's product — not an exposure to China's critical-materials export-control regime or to a China end market. Centrus's structural supply tension is its dependence on TENEX, a Russian enrichment supplier (documented in the LEU atom context and not part of this node). The China connection at LEU is one freight-cost risk factor, peripheral to the enrichment story. Backdrop only.

Asymmetric geometry

(a) The two-faced node — which holdings sit on which face

The defining feature of this node is that it pays in one direction and subtracts in the other, and the portfolio sits on both sides at once.

On the demand-creating face: UAMY, REA, and UUUU. For these three, China restricting its own exports is the event that gives the holding its case. UAMY is the only one of the three where the demand-creating effect is already in the reported numbers — a 230% realized-price rise and 163% revenue growth in FY2025, with the export-restriction framing in the atom context and the price and revenue figures in reported_results (atom UAMY-0001104659-26-032049, context and reported_results). REA and UUUU sit on the demand-creating face at the level of thesis, not revenue: REA is pre-revenue and exploration-stage (atom REA-0001193125-26-209799, reported_results), and UUUU's REE segment recorded zero revenue in FY2025 with REE profits not expected until the 2028–2030 timeframe (atom UUUU-0001385849-26-000009, reported_results and forward_guidance). The demand-creating face of the node is, for two of its three holdings, a forward case rather than a realized one.

On the closed-market face: MP and HL. For these two, the 2025 tariff exchange removed a revenue channel. MP's loss is itemized to the dollar — concentrate revenue from $144.4M to $0 (atom MP-0001801368-26-000008, reported_results[4]; atom MP-0001801368-26-000029, reported_results[2]). HL's loss is named and dated but not separately quantified, because the silver-price environment absorbed the redirected concentrate (atom HL-0001193125-26-055059, risk_factor_deltas).

The single node, therefore, is demand-creating for the antimony and rare-earth producers' theses and subtractive for MP's concentrate line and HL's China channel — and the two effects are not independent events. China's mid-2024 antimony restrictions, China's April 2025 dysprosium/terbium restrictions, and China's March 2025 reciprocal tariffs on US goods are the same policy sequence viewed from different ends of the trade. A portfolio holding UAMY and HL together holds one position whose pricing is set by China withholding exports and one whose export channel was closed by China's reciprocal tariffs — both consequences of the 2025 escalation.

(b) The MP–DoW cross-node hinge

MP is where the China node and the Department of War node connect, and the connection is the kind that is invisible from reading either ticker's filings in isolation against a single entity.

Read MP against the China node alone, the finding is: MP ceased all China sales in July 2025 and lost its largest customer channel (atom MP-0001801368-26-000008, reported_results[26]). Read MP against the DoW node alone, the finding is: MP accepted a $400.0M preferred-equity investment, a $150.0M loan, a $110/kg NdPr price floor, and a 10X Facility offtake (documented in department-of-war.md). Each reading is correct and incomplete. The atoms show the two are one transaction: the FY2025 10-K attributes the China cessation explicitly to "the terms of the DoW Transaction Agreements" (atom MP-0001801368-26-000008, reported_results[26], verbatim), and the DoW negative covenants prohibit sales to "Restricted Buyers" (atom MP-0001801368-26-000008, reported_results[27], verbatim). The same covenant package that brought the government revenue framework in required the China customer relationship to go out.

This is the cross-node finding the masses layer exists to surface. A per-ticker reading of MP records both facts. An entity-wiki reading of the DoW node records the covenant. Only reading the China node and the DoW node together — and noticing they meet at the same MP covenant — reveals that MP's federal backing and MP's China exit are a single causal event, not two. The PPA income line tells the same story from the cash side: the $42.3M of PPA income MP recognized in Q1 2026 (atom MP-0001801368-26-000029, reported_results[4]) is the government-backed revenue stream that the DoW node provided, recognized in the same quarter that concentrate revenue printed $0 because the China channel the DoW node closed is gone (atom MP-0001801368-26-000029, reported_results[2]). The DoW node and the China node are, at MP, the credit and debit of one ledger entry.

UAMY is a second cross-node ticker, but its geometry is different and worth contrasting. UAMY also sits on both the China node and the DoW node, but at UAMY the two nodes are aligned in the same direction: China's antimony export restrictions created the supply scarcity, and the DoW's $27.0M DPA Title III grant and $248M DLA contract are the policy response paying UAMY to build capacity against that scarcity (atom UAMY-0001104659-26-061193, reported_results; atom UAMY-0001104659-26-061217_ex99-1). At MP the two nodes pull against each other within one company — DoW backing required the China exit. At UAMY they pull together — China's restriction is the reason the DoW is funding UAMY at all. The masses layer surfaces both cross-node shapes; they are not the same shape.

(c) Forward risk — the reversibility of the 2025 measures

The risk attached to this node is unusual because it is symmetric and it cuts the book in opposite directions at once. The MP 10-K records that a US–China trade deal reached in November 2025 suspended the expanded export controls and the retaliatory tariffs imposed since March 2025: it states China agreed to suspend implementation of the expanded export controls and to suspend retaliatory tariffs and non-tariff measures imposed since March 2025, and does not characterize the suspension as permanent (atom MP-0001801368-26-000008, reported_results[29]). The UUUU Q1 2026 10-Q carries tariff and trade-war risk for its REE and HMS product sales as a standing risk factor and does not record the November 2025 suspension specifically (atom UUUU-0001385849-26-000021, risk_factor_deltas).

A reversal of the 2025 export-control regime — China resuming free export of antimony and heavy rare earths — would compress the demand-creating face: it would pressure the antimony price that drove UAMY's FY2025 results and narrow the supply gap that underwrites the REA and UUUU heavy-REE theses. A reversal of the tariff exchange — China reopening to US silver concentrate and US rare-earth concentrate — would reopen the closed-market face: it would restore an export channel to HL and, in principle, to MP, though MP's exit is contractually locked by the DoW Restricted-Buyer covenant rather than by the tariff and would not reopen on a tariff change alone. The node's forward risk is therefore not a single direction. The same de-escalation event that would compress the antimony and heavy-REE producers' pricing would reopen an export channel for the closed-market silver and concentrate sellers. This is the portfolio-level signature of a two-faced node: its dominant forward risk does not move the holdings together.

Source atoms referenced

• UAMY: 0001104659-26-032049 (10-K, 2026-03-19) — China ~70-80% of global antimony mine output and mid-2024 export restrictions (context); Rotterdam antimony price $23.88/lb 2025 vs $10.44/lb 2024 and UAMY realized price $25.12/lb vs $7.61/lb, +230% (reported_results); FY2025 revenue +163%. 0001104659-26-061193 (10-Q, 2026-05-14) — Q1 2026 antimony cost per pound +69% YoY as higher-cost ore moved through cost of sales; $27.0M DPA Title III grant, $12.8M milestone-approved (cross-node, DoW). 0001104659-26-061217_ex99-1 (8-K, 2026-05-14) — $248M DLA IDIQ ceiling, delivery notices to DoW (cross-node, DoW).
• REA: 0001193125-26-209799 (424B4, 2026-05-07) — China restricted dysprosium and terbium exports since April 2025 in response to US tariffs, Myanmar heavy-REE feedstock flagged unreliable (reported_results, Market Assessment); ionic adsorption clay deposit style dominant in Chinese heavy-REE production and rare outside China, China export restriction created a supply gap for non-Chinese sources (context); no mineral reserve at any project, exploration-stage, pre-revenue (reported_results and forward_guidance).
• UUUU: 0001385849-26-000021 (10-Q, 2026-05-06) — REE prices reported on a Benchmark European, ex-China basis (NdPr $97.50→$125.00/kg, Dy $988→$1,300/kg, Tb $3,575→$4,500/kg) (reported_results); first kilogram of high-purity terbium oxide, "first U.S. primary production of this critical 'heavy' rare earth material in decades" (reported_results); tariff/trade-war risk added to REE/HMS product-sales risk factors (risk_factor_deltas). 0001385849-26-000009 (10-K, 2026-02-26) — ex-China heavy-REE separation capacity absent from the western supply chain to date (context); REE segment zero revenue FY2025 and FY2024, REE profits expected minimal until 2028–2030 (reported_results and forward_guidance).
• MP: 0001801368-26-000008 (10-K, 2026-02-26) — ceased all sales to China July 2025 to align with the DoW Transaction Agreements; vast majority of concentrate historically sold to Shenghe Resources in China; REO Sales Volume -73% YoY (reported_results[26]); DoW negative covenant prohibiting sales to "Restricted Buyers" (reported_results[27]); concentrate revenue $144.4M FY2024 → $42.0M FY2025 (reported_results[4]); China imposed and expanded export controls through 2025, November 2025 trade deal suspended expanded controls and post-March-2025 retaliatory tariffs (reported_results[29]). 0001801368-26-000029 (10-Q, 2026-05-08) — Q1 2026 concentrate revenue $0; Q1 2026 PPA income $42.3M; concentrate revenue expected materially lower in future periods (reported_results, forward_guidance). 0001801368-26-000027_ex (8-K, 2026-05-07) — Q1 2026 concentrate revenue $0 vs $30.1M Q1 2025 (reported_results). 0001193125-25-287046_ex99-1 (8-K, 2025-11-19) — China named in context as the historical holder of the commanding position in rare-earth separation; Maaden JV is a DoW-node transaction, not a China-node connection.
• HL: 0001193125-26-055059 (10-K, 2026-02-17) — China market "effectively closed" since March 2025 under a 20% Chinese reciprocal tariff on silver concentrate, no products shipped to China since March 2025 (risk_factor_deltas); customers in Japan, South Korea, Canada with China closed (reported_results, background). 0001193125-26-206810 (10-Q, 2026-05-05) — Q1 2026 results attributed to silver and gold price strength; China closure not separately quantified (context).
• RDW: 0001819810-26-000029 (10-K, 2026-02-27) — tariffs on imports from Canada, Mexico, EU, Japan, and China named in a generic supply-chain-cost risk factor; China is one of five countries, no China-specific connection (risk_factor_deltas). Backdrop only.
• URG: 0001104659-26-044445 (424B5, 2026-04-16) — "U.S.-China tensions, wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, and recent tariff impositions" cited in a carried-forward general geopolitical-risk factor; no China customer or supply dependency (risk_factor_deltas). Backdrop only.
• LEU: 0001628280-26-007117 (10-K, 2026-02-11) — USTR April 17, 2025 investigation into China's maritime sector could impose fees on Chinese-built vessels used by LEU's carrier; a shipping-logistics risk, not an exposure to China's export-control regime or a China end market (risk_factor_deltas). Backdrop only.
• LYSDY: manual_d37d7c2ff100d248 (FY2025 Annual Report, 2025-08-28) — self-described as the world's only commercial producer of both separated Light and Heavy Rare Earth oxides outside China (background); first commercial production of separated Dysprosium oxide May 2025 and Terbium oxide June 2025 at Lynas Malaysia, the two heavy REEs required for high-temperature NdFeB magnets (reported_results); average China domestic NdPr price US$44/kg June 2024 rising to US$55/kg June 2025 with quarterly progression US$48/$51/$53/$53 across Sep-24 to Jun-25 (reported_results citing risk factors); geopolitical factors added as explicit sub-bullet under rare earth price risk citing global trade tariffs and restrictions and supply chain resilience focus (risk_factor_deltas). manual_714aac2447ae02d3 (Quarterly Activities Report, 2026-04-21) — Q3 FY2026 revenue A$265.0m (+115% YoY), NdPr production 1,996t, total REO 3,233t (reported_results); first production of Samarium oxide in March 2026 one month ahead of schedule, ~400 t/yr expected capacity (reported_results); the only commercial-scale producer of separated light and heavy rare earth oxides operating entirely outside China (context). Demand-creating, structural -- realized production line; cross-node with Department of War (the same US Government LOI provides product-purchase funding originally allocated to a now-uncertain Texas heavy REE facility build).

Checked and excluded: CDE (Coeur Mining) — the seed scan's critical-minerals cluster could plausibly have flagged CDE as a silver producer with potential China-market exposure parallel to HL. The CDE atoms were reviewed: the only trade reference is generic forward-looking-statements boilerplate citing "impacts from tariffs or other trade barriers" (atom CDE-0000215466-26-000021_ex99-1, risk_factor_deltas) with no mention of China and no China-market closure analogous to HL's. CDE does not name China in any atom and is excluded from the node. DNN (Denison Mines) and WRN (Western Copper and Gold) — both reviewed; no atom in either folder contains any China, Chinese, tariff, or export-control reference. Excluded.